“Is Mind Control Possible?  Absolutely.  There is a mountain of evidence…  Today we know there are technologies that can induce sound into the brain at a distance, can monitor and alter brainwaves at a distance, can alter behavior at a distance, can induce images into the brain at a distance, can target individual organs at a distance.  Can disrupt the calcium ions binding on individual cell surfaces at a distance, creating pain and other effects anywhere in the body.  Mind control technology exists, without a question.”
           —  Dr Eldon Byrd, U.S. Navy, 2001

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nationalsecurity_localpolice_web.pdfDownload File
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/NationalSecurity_LocalPolice_web.pdf

The Fusion Centers, the FBI and Infragard, all use the FBI’s eGuardian Network to violate the civil rights of US citizens.  Data is collected and stored on eGuardian in violation of the US Constitution, without reasonable suspicion.  The Senate Subcommittee of Investigations sent a memo to the DHS in 2008, instructing them to stop the harassment.  It has not stopped.

Moreover, the members of Targeted Justice have detailed how their homes are routinely broken into, they are threatened, harassed, stalked, property damage, assault  & battery, and more.  Some of this is done to silence our whistleblowers.

Brennan Center for Justice published their research on the corrupted Fusion Centers in the United States.  Fusion Centers routinely violate the civil rights of US citizens.  Police Depts included in the study:

New York City Police Department (NYPD)•
Chicago Police Department (CPD)•
Los Angeles County Sheriff’sDepartment (LASD)•
Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)•
Philadelphia Police Department (PPD)•
Houston Police Department (HPD)•
Metropolitan Police Department (MPDC)•
Miami -Dade County Police Department (MDPD)•
Detroit Police Department (DPD)•
San Francisco Police Department (SFPD)•
Seattle Police Department (SPD)•
Miami Police Department (MPD)•
Portland Police Bureau (PPB)•
Minneapolis Police Department (MPD)•
St. Paul Police Department (SPPD)•
Dearborn Police Department (DPD)

In Houston:

“Houston’s fusion center, the Houston Regional Intelligence Service Center (HRISC), also professes to follow to 28 CFR 23.  But it too maintains intelligence information that does not meet the reasonable suspicion threshold for one year.  Moreover, if shared with the FBI’s eGuardian network, the bureau can keep any of this information for at least five years.”  page 28

“… the Houston police have their own criteria, which are so broad as to include “any suspicious person or event … determined as suspicious or worthy of reporting by an officer or supervisor.” page 14

“The Houston Independent Police Oversight Board is typical of this approach. This 20-member civilian board, appointed by the mayor, reviews all major internal investigations to “determine if the investigation was sufficient and the conclusions were correct.” It can make nonbinding disciplinary recommendations or request additional investigation by the police, and if necessary, by the city’s Inspector General. The board is new, created in 2011 after the disclosure of video showing four Houston police officers beating a 15-year old burglary suspect. Although intended to operate independently from the police, its lack of subpoena power and investigative authority has raised concerns about its effectiveness.  The board also has no authority to sit in on questioning during an Internal Affairs investigation. pg 28.

“[The Houston Fusion Center]… has incorporated these provisions into their privacy policies. But in each instance, the privacy officer is a fusion center employee.”  pg 36.

“For example, the Houston MOU cites the FBI guidelines as a “controlling document” with only a caveat that any conflict with state or local law “will be jointly resolved.”  This hedging provides Houston officers with little practical instruction as to what to do in case of conflicts.”  pg 37.

“See Houston Police Dep’t, General Order 800-07: Criteria for Submitting Incident Reports 2-3 (2007) (on file with the Brennan Center) (requiring officers to report “suspicious persons, vehicles, or activities involved in videotaping, photographing, sketching, drawing … or asking detailed questions regarding buildings”; “a person or event associated with suspicious possession of … suspicious posters, fliers, or other publications”; “any protest or demonstration associated with terrorism, acts of war, attacks, [or] unusual suspicious activity …”; and “any suspicious person or event not listed in the above categories but determined as suspicious or worthy of reporting by an officer or supervisor.”).”  pg 54

“In Houston, officers are required to report: “suspicious persons, vehicles, or activities involved in videotaping, photographing, sketching, drawing … or asking detailed questions regarding buildings”; “a person or event associated with suspicious possession of … suspicious posters, fliers, or other publications”; “any protest or demonstration associated with terrorism, acts of war, attacks, [or] unusual suspicious activity …”; and “any suspicious person or event not listed in the above categories but determined as suspicious or worthy of reporting by an officer or supervisor.” Hous. Police Dep’t, supra note 128, at 2-4. ”  pg 56.

“According to the Houston privacy policy, “[a]ll information and intelligence will be obtained lawfully and products produced will be handled in accordance with 28 CFR Part 23, and applicable State of Texas laws.” Hous. Reg’l Intelligence Serv. Ctr. (HRISC), Houston Regional Intelligence Service Center (Fusion Center) Privacy Policy: Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties Policy 4 (2009), available athttp://www.nfcausa.org/files/DDF/Privacy%20Policy%20HRISC%20September%2009%20SSNP%20.pdf.”  pg 63.

“City of Houston, Executive Order No. 1-5 Revised § 6.1 (2011) (Independent Police Oversight Board), available athttp://www.houstontx.gov/execorders/1-5.pdf.” pg 64.

“The Inspector General for the City of Houston serves as an “ombudsmen” to assist citizens in filing complaints. City of Houston, Executive Order No. 1-39 Revised § 5.1.5 (2011) (Establishment of Office of Inspector General for Investigation of Employee Misconduct), available athttp://www.houstontx.gov/legal/1-39.pdf. The IG may also conduct its own investigation if it agrees with the Independent Police Oversight Board that additional investigation is necessary and the Chief of Police has refused to do so. City of Houston, Executive Order No. 1-5, supranote 265, at § 7.1.6; City of Houston, Press Conference: Police Oversight Initiatives, YouTube.com (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sk9wuAY5G7k. The Houston Independent Police Oversight Board also has authority to make policy recommendations on a limited range of issues: hiring new police officers, training on the proper treatment of citizens, and community concerns. City of Houston, Executive Order No. 1-5, supra note 265, at § 5.2.”  pg 64.

“Cindy George, Some Doubt City’s Efforts to Rebuild Trust in HPD, Houston Chron. (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Some-doubt-city-s-efforts-to-rebuild-trust-in-HPD-1690326.php; see also Who’s Policing the Police?,MyFox Houston (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.myfoxhouston.com/story/18179645/whos-policing-the-police; James Pinkerton, Punishments for HPD Officers Often Unravel, Houston Chron.(Feb. 20, 2011), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Punishments-for-HPD-officers-often-unravel-1687733.php”  pg 64.

“The Houston Police Department operates the Houston Regional Intelligence Service Center Hous. Reg’l Intelligence Serv. Ctr., Privacy Policy: Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties Policy 3 (2009), available athttp://www.nfcausa.org/files/DDF/Privacy%20Policy%20HRISC%20September%2009%20SSNP%20.pdf; see also Hous. Police Dep’t, FY2012 Core Services Assessment 20-22 (2011) available athttp://www.houstontx.gov/council//1/csad/hpd-csa.pdf. A police sergeant is responsible for overseeing compliance with the center’s privacy policy and responding to public complaints concerning privacy civil rights, and civil liberties violations. Hous. Reg’l Intelligence Serv. Ctr., supra, at 5. And the Houston Police Department is responsible for conducting compliance audits according to departmental procedure. Id. at 10. The Texas Department of Public Safety operates the state’s primary fusion center, the Texas Fusion Center. The state privacy policy requires annual audits of fusion center records, but that responsibility falls to a privacy officer appointed by the general counsel for the Department of Public Safety. Tx. Fusion Ctr., Privacy, Civil Right, and Civil Liberties Policy 2, 15 (2010), available athttp://www.dps.texas.gov/docs/TxFCPrivacyPolicy113010.pdf. The privacy officer is an attorney from the Department of Public Safety. Id. at 2. A 2011 state law created a “Fusion Center Policy Council” within the Texas Department of Public Safety, designed to assist the state in monitoring the activities of all fusion centers in Texas. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 421.083 (West 2013). The Council, however, is composed entirely of representatives from the fusion centers. Id” pg 64.

“Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Joint Terrorism Task Force: Standard Memorandum of UnderstandingBetween the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Houston Police Department (2007) [hereinafter Houston JTTF MOU] (on file with Brennan Center)” pg 73.

“In Houston, a memorandum in effect since 2007 cites the FBI guidelines as a “controlling document” with only a caveat that any conflict with state or local law “will be jointly resolved.”Houston JTTF MOU, supra note 339. This leaves Houston officers assigned to the JTTF with little practical guidance. By comparison, a previous memo from 1993 clearly stated that “personnel of the HPD shall be required to utilize only those investigative techniques consistent with their given standards and procedures.” Hous. Counterterrorism Task Force, Memorandum of Understanding1 (1993) (on file with the Brennan Center). It also mandated that “[t]o the extent that HPD standards and procedures impose any greater restrictions upon the use for their informants and cooperating witnesses, such personnel shall be bound by those restrictions.” pg 75.

Targeted Individuals
individuos apuntados
Individuo dirigido
Personne ciblée
Individu ciblé
فرد مستهدف
目标个人
目標個人
लक्षित व्यक्ति
Individu yang Disasarkan
Целевая личность
লক্ষ্যযুক্ত ব্যক্তি
Indivíduo segmentado
対象者
Zielgruppe
Diangkah Individu
대상 개인
Hedeflenen Birey
Cá nhân được nhắm mục tiêu
లక్ష్యంగా ఉన్న వ్యక్తి
लक्ष्यित वैयक्तिक
இலக்கு தனிநபர்
Individuo mirato
نشانہ انفرادی۔
લક્ષ્યાંકિત વ્યક્તિગત
Ukierunkowana osoba
Цільова особа
فردی هدفمند
ടാർഗെറ്റുചെയ്‌ത വ്യക്തിഗത
ಉದ್ದೇಶಿತ ವೈಯಕ್ತಿಕ
ਨਿਸ਼ਾਨਾ ਵਿਅਕਤੀਗਤ
ඉලක්කගත තනි පුද්ගලයෙකි
Individual vizat
Məqsədli Fərdi